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Discounts and Termination of Closed End Funds 
 
Abstract 
Based on an extensive sample of U.S. closed end funds undergoing termination, 
this study offers a comprehensive analysis of closed end fund exiting behaviors. 
There are four ways for a fund to exit: merger into other closed-end fund, liquidation, 
conversion to open-end mutual fund and merger into open-end mutual fund. Closed-
end funds that exit must choose the most efficient and optimal mechanisms 
corresponding to funds‟ characteristics and organizational forms. In this study, I find 
that closed-end funds exit optimally. First, funds with persistently larger discount and 
smaller size are more likely to exit and consistent with rational expectation, market 
incorporates open ending expectation into price/discount of closed-end funds. 
Discount level gradually adjusts to industry average before open ending, especially 
for liquidating funds; closed-end funds which are open-ended have larger discounts, 
larger cumulative abnormal returns CARs (t-1, t, t+1) and more significant relationships 
between CARs (t-1, t, t+1) and discounts than funds which are close-ended. Second, 
discount is not systematically predictive of liquidation probability; both merged funds 
and acquiring funds experience similar level of discount and the coefficients of 
discount for acquiring funds are not significantly different from that of merged funds. 
Third, dividend is negatively related with open ending but positively with closed 
ending; funds with high dividend yield are more likely to be acquired by other closed-
end funds and less likely to liquidate or convert to mutual.  
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1. Introduction 
A "closed-end fund," legally known as a "closed-end company," is a simple form of 
corporation which invests in a portfolio of various assets. A closed-end fund issues a 
fixed number of shares and uses the proceeds to invest in securities like stocks or 
bonds. The shares of closed-end funds are traded in stock exchanges and are not 
redeemed or issued on demand. Details of the investment portfolio is publicly 
disclosed quarterly with SEC and the value of the portfolio on a per share basis 
(known as “net asset value,” NAV) is computed daily and reported at least weekly in 
the financial press. In an efficient market with rational investors, the share price of a 
closed end fund should equal its NAV, yet closed end funds are often found to trade 
at prices that deviate from their NAVs. The deviation of closed end fund prices from 
the NAV - the discount
1
, has long remained a puzzle. Gemmill and Thomas (2002) 
provide evidence that it is not unusual for closed end funds to be trading at prices 
ranging from 5 percent above to 30 percent below their NAVs. Different from mutual 
funds, closed-end funds do not generally stand ready to provide liquidity to investors. 
Without incurring transaction cost associated with liquidity provision, closed-end 
funds are able to invest in a greater amount of “illiquid” securities than mutual funds. 
The above special organizational form results in some interesting features. First, 
closed-end funds behave like common public firms. Their fund shares usually trade at 
prices greater or less than the net asset values (NAV), so-called premium or discount 
puzzle. Second, closed-end funds have some common features with mutual funds. 
They charge fees and their underlying assets or fundamentals are known at any given 
                                                          
1
 “Discount” is the difference between the exchange-traded price and the underlying per share 
value of the portfolio of the fund given by its net asset value (NAV). The discount is positive 
if the price exceeds the NAV.   
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time. Third, closed-end funds have to meet liquidity provision by paying out dividend 
at certain level.   
The legal structure of closed-end funds provides a stable asset base. This enables the 
portfolio manager of the closed-end fund to make longer-term investment decisions 
based on the fund‟s investment strategy without being concerned about potential 
redemption of shares by the shareholders. Open-end funds tend to have a fluctuating 
asset due to purchase and redemption requests by shareholders. Therefore, investor 
sentiment might affect the portfolio structure rather than the investment philosophy of 
the fund. This view is consistent with Lee, Shleifer and Thaler (1991). Another 
disadvantage of converting a close-end fund into an open-end fund is that closed-end 
funds can add leverage to their portfolio whereas open-end funds do not have this 
opportunity. A final difference between open-end and closed-end funds is that the 
latter are able to direct more investments into illiquid securities. 
Generally there are four ways for a fund to exit: merger into other closed-end fund, 
liquidation, conversion to open-end mutual fund and merger into open-end mutual 
fund. Shareholders who hope to eliminate the share price discounts from net asset 
value usually initiate open-ending
2
 events. Open-ending a closed-end fund is to 
eventually force fund to accept redemption of share for cash at NAV. Essentially a 
fund will exit from closed-end fund industry. Open ending includes three approaches: 
to liquidate, to merge into an open-end mutual and to convert to a mutual fund. 
Because open ending is in effect a partial or complete liquidation process for 
underlying assets, it forces any discount or premium to disappear as in mutual funds. 
                                                          
2
  The term “open-ending” refers to any of the events that terminate a closed-end fund: 
liquidation of the fund, conversion to an open-end fund, or merger with an open-ended fund.   
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Close-ending a closed-end fund is another way in which a fund exits from market 
place. To close-end a fund is equivalent to merge itself into another closed-end fund. 
After merger, the underlying assets remain closed-end to investors so that fund does 
not incur any costs associated with liquidating underlying assets, especially illiquid 
ones in a short period. Such transaction costs would otherwise be enormous for 
portfolios holding thin-traded securities such as municipal bond, high-yield corporate 
bond, emerging market stocks or mortgage-backed securities. Close ending has 
another advantage that fund management companies can keep fees collected from 
underlying asset. So most mergers should take place between two funds within the 
same fund family.  
Whether a closed-end fund makes exiting choices optimally according to 
fundamentals as well as arbitrage opportunities are the main questions this study 
attempts to answer. As stated above, closed-end funds can exit through four 
mechanisms and all these exiting mechanisms have different economic rationales and 
therefore different institutional arrangements. If a fund is merged by another closed-
end fund, the original fund shareholders will receive acquiring fund shares according 
to two funds‟ NAV. Such exiting decisions will not eliminate discount in fund share 
prices. Factors such as economy of scale and industry consolidation are likely to be 
the rationale for fund to engage merger activities. When a fund chooses open ending 
mechanisms such as liquidation, opening to mutual or merger into open-end mutual 
funds, the fund has to stand ready to provide liquidity for redemption shares at NAV 
at different levels. Choices in open ending must be associated with different 
motivations and economic rationales. Previous literature neither differentiates the 
various fund termination mechanisms, nor does it study merger and acquisition 
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among closed-end funds. This study will complement the literature by filling up the 
gap.  
If open ending is systematically predictable and open ending eliminates discount in a 
short period, sophisticated investors can develop a trading strategy to exploit discount 
before open ending. As a result, these speculative activities will eliminate large 
abnormal discount of potential open-ending funds. In the equilibrium with rational 
expectation, there must be no relationship between open ending and discounts at 
announcement date, unless there are institutional arrangements to make arbitrager 
very costly. If open ending takes the form of liquidation, fund has to distribute all 
assets at NAV. In such a case, there should be no prior large and persistent discounts 
associated with fund share price. Otherwise arbitrageurs can simply buy the fund 
shares before a liquidation announcement and make handsome profits. In equilibrium 
with rational expectation, discount should not be systematically associated with fund 
liquidation choice. If a fund is merged into an open-end fund or open to mutual by 
itself, fund with large discount must have some institutional arrangements to make 
arbitrage costly in order to protect long-term investors. Usually a fund will charge a 
large redemption fee within a minimum redemption period to align the interest of 
short-term speculators with long-term investors.  
What types of securities a fund holds should have impact on the choice for a fund to 
exit. Asset liquidity should be positively associated with the likelihood a fund going 
to open-end. Since more illiquid asset a fund holds, more transaction costs it incurs in 
the open-ending process. Open ending requires a fund to liquidate partial or all asset 
positions in a short period. Municipal bond fund, emerging market fund and mortgage 
fund have illiquid assets and they are specialized investment conduit, so they are less 
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likely to open-end or close-end. I use dummy for fund asset types to capture 
differences in the asset illiquidity. The dummies are municipal bond, high-yield 
corporate bond, emerging market equity, and mortgage-based securities. 
Using a large sample of maximum 502 closed-end funds including 104 exiting funds 
during January 1994 through December 2006 period, this paper contribute to existing 
literature from several perspectives. First, this study updates the results of abnormal 
returns on closed end fund termination announcement events. To my best knowledge, 
the last study is by Brauer (1984) and Brickley and Schallheim (1985) both of which 
are more than two decades old and were based on relatively small samples of closed 
end funds. The advantage of using a large sample is the richness and depth of the data. 
The previous literature on closed-end funds only takes a small sample. The limitation 
is twofold. On the one hand, small sample results in selection biases; on the other 
hand, it may induce bias by using the wrong comparison group. The sample used by 
this study includes all closed-end fund observations in CRSP data set for the sample 
period from January 1994 to December 2004. Second, since there have been no 
empirical studies on close ending in closed-end fund industry, nor does the literature 
differentiate various choices of open ending, e.g., liquidation vs. conversion to mutual, 
this study fills in the gap of the literature and examines the economic determinants of 
fund exiting decisions. The analysis also takes into account arbitrage, fund 
characteristics, underlying assets and illiquidity issues.  
The main findings of this study, based on a large sample of 104 closed end fund 
exiting events, are as follows. First, funds with persistently larger discount and 
smaller size are more likely to exit and consistent with rational expectation, market 
incorporates open ending expectation into price/discount of closed-end funds. 
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Discount level gradually adjusts to industry average before open ending, especially 
for liquidating funds; closed-end funds which are open-ended have larger discounts, 
larger cumulative abnormal returns CARs (t-1, t, t+1) and more significant relationships 
between CARs (t-1, t, t+1) and discounts than funds which are close-ended. Second, 
discount is not systematically predictive of liquidation probability; both merged funds 
and acquiring funds experience similar level of discount and the coefficients of 
discount for acquiring funds are not significantly different from that of merged funds. 
Third, dividend is negatively related with open ending but positively with closed 
ending; funds with high dividend yield are more likely to be acquired by other closed-
end funds and less likely to liquidate or convert to mutual.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II provides a brief 
summary of the related literature. Section III discusses the data collection method in 
detail, provides the summary statistics and introduces the methodology used by this 
study. Section IV describes the hypotheses proposed by this study and documents the 
main empirical findings. Section V concludes the paper. 
2. Related Literature 
There are two strands of literature on closed-end funds. One is on event study of IPO 
or open ending of closed-end funds and another is about pricing of closed-end funds. 
The limited research on the former topic, especially on open ending, may be 
attributed to the small size of the sample available. More research has been focused 
on the economic explanation of the existence of discount or premium on fund shares.  
Most mutual funds are open-end funds in the sense that the fund stands ready to 
accept more money at any time and will redeem shares for current stockholders at the 
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"net asset value" of the fund, that is, the market value (per share) of the securities the 
fund holds. In the case of a closed-end fund, the management raises a certain amount 
of capital, say $100 million, buys a portfolio of securities which it will manage 
according to its charter, and then issues a fixed number of shares, say 10 million. The 
shares are traded on organized stock markets, including the New York Stock Ex-
change. Any stockholder who wants to liquidate must sell the shares at the market 
price. The share price, of course, is set by supply and demand, and therefore can 
diverge from the net asset value. Indeed, the stock prices of closed-end funds often do 
diverge from net asset values. Funds selling for less than their net asset value are said 
to trade at a discount, while those selling for more than net asset value are said to sell 
at a premium. During 1989 it was possible to find most of the funds selling at 
substantial discounts (greater than 30 percent) and others selling for enormous premia 
(in one case over 100 percent). In the case of closed-end funds, therefore, it is 
common to find that the price is wrong! This raises the question: how can mispricing 
of closed-end funds survive smart investors in the context of the efficient market 
hypothesis and rational agents? If closed-end funds are so clearly mispriced, can't a 
smart investor make money? Why don't rational traders buy the funds up at the 
bargain prices? The answer is that in buying a closed-end fund, even at a discount, a 
rational trader must bear two kinds of risk. The first is that the net asset value of the 
fund will underperform the market. The second risk is that when the rational trader 
wishes to sell the fund the discount may have widened, because noise traders have 
become even more pessimistic. This analysis implies that rational investors will only 
be willing to buy closed-end funds if they are compensated for the noise-trader risk, 
that is, if they can buy the funds at a discount! It should be stressed that this 
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explanation does not rely on the average pessimism of noise traders; it stems 
completely from the risk aversion of the rational investors. The fact that discounts 
disappear when funds are liquidated or open-ended also fits, since when either of 
these events happen, noise trader risk is eliminated. As discussed above, mispricing 
can occur because no riskless arbitrage opportunity exists, and the supply of rational 
investors willing to make long-term bets is limited. 
Early studies (i.e. Malkiel, 1977; Brauer, 1984) hypothesize that the exchange-traded 
prices are different from the reported NAV because of hidden costs such as capital 
gain tax liability, illiquidity of the portfolio, and agency costs. Lee, Shleifer, and 
Thaler (1991) argue that such costs do not fluctuate much over short horizons while 
the closed end fund discounts fluctuate highly even on weekly interval; thus, the 
presence of hidden costs cannot provide sole explanation for the closed end fund 
discount. More recent explanations for the closed end fund discount include investor 
sentiment hypothesis (Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler, 1991), costly arbitrage hypothesis 
(Pontiff, 1996; Gemmill and Thomas, 2002), and signaling hypothesis (Johnson, Lin, 
and Song, 2006). 
The investor sentiment hypothesis proposes that the discount is a mechanism by 
which closed end fund holders are compensated for the risk of their inability to sell 
the funds at the NAV, as noise traders become more pessimistic when closed end 
fund owners want to sell. The liquidation date is usually announced shortly following 
the first termination announcement. If noise traders are pessimistic during the period 
between announcement and actual liquidation, the holders of the soon-to-be 
liquidated closed end funds could simply wait for the liquidation event and achieve 
better price outcome. Also, if the holders of the closed end funds must sell 
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immediately, they should be able to do so at prices close to NAV since the buyers are 
also aware of the impending liquidation event. Investors will bid up the price based 
on the knowledge that they will be soon paid an amount equal to the NAV less 
liquidation expenses. The noise trader risk should be greatly reduced upon the 
termination announcement, and consequently, the role of investor sentiments in the 
structure of closed end fund discounts should be greatly attenuated after the 
liquidation announcement.  
The costly arbitrage hypothesis posits that closed end fund discount exists because 
arbitrageurs do not adequately perform their roles in the presence of high transaction 
costs. If the arbitrageurs or active shareholders want to purchase majority of the 
shares and liquidate the closed end fund, they will require high upfront investment 
and they have to face with problems as below. First, borrowing shares is often very 
difficult, so one can't sell the funds short. This has been the case with closed-end fund 
IPO's, as well as with many country funds recently, whether from restricted or from 
unrestricted markets. Even if an investor could sell them short, the proceeds are not 
received immediately, 
3
 raising the cost of this trade. Second, even if an investor 
manages to sell a fund short and buy its portfolio, the premium can get larger before it 
gets smaller, leading to a capital loss on the position and the demand by the broker for 
more funds. If you shorted the Spain fund at a 20 percent premium, you might be 
broke as the premium rose to 100 percent. Unless the investor is very patient and has 
deep pockets, this arbitrage trade would not pay.  Additionally, resistance from 
entrenched managers (see Bradley, Brav, Goldstein, and Jiang, 2007) will exacerbate 
                                                          
3
 An investor's proceeds on short sales are only paid, net of costs, when the position is closed. 
The credit position created by the short sale typically earns no interest for the investor. 
10 
 
the arbitrage costs as well as the probability of the failure of the strategy. These costs 
would discourage arbitrageurs from disciplining the market. In the presence of low 
costs, arbitrageurs may buy closed end fund shares and short sell the funds‟ portfolio. 
Lee et al (1991) argue that the dividend from the long position will entirely offset the 
dividend from the short position, enabling the investors to capture the discount as the 
arbitrage profit. However, because the closed end fund portfolio may not be easily 
replicable and the fund manager can change the structure of the portfolio composition 
by active trading, the arbitrageurs may be unable to mimic their short portfolio 
appropriately. And if the arbitrageurs must liquidate their short portfolio before the 
funds in their long portfolio are terminated, they are exposed to the risk that the 
discount may widen by the time they liquidate the portfolio. These costs of arbitrage 
may discourage arbitrageurs from disciplining the markets. Subsequent to the 
termination announcement it is expected that the arbitrage costs would be somewhat 
mitigated leading to weaker explanatory power over the remaining discount. 
Subsequent to the announcement, arbitrageurs do not require large upfront investment 
or buy majority of the funds or convince shareholders to liquidate the funds. Further, 
they are unlikely to face resistance from entrenched managers. Third, since the 
holding period is relatively short, the arbitrage strategy is easier and less risky to 
undertake. In other words, arbitrage strategies are less costly and much easier to 
conduct; hence, the portion of discount due to costly arbitrage should be greatly 
reduced after the termination announcement.  
The signaling hypothesis argues that closed end fund discount exists due to 
asymmetric information between fund managers and investors. Closed end funds that 
commit to pay high dividends send a signal to investors about their superior 
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performance. Prior to the termination announcement, the holding period can be 
infinite and returns on investing in closed-end funds mainly rely on future 
performance of the funds. A good signal about future performance of the funds is 
therefore necessary. However, after termination announcement, the fund holding 
period becomes relatively short. The value of the closed end fund is less due to future 
performance of the funds, but more based on the current portfolio value. The signal 
assumes lower importance because investor will soon receive the liquidation value of 
the closed end fund portfolio. 
In a typical open-ending, the board of directors requests an open-ending proposal 
from the management. Once the board approves restructuring, shareholders vote is 
required. The terms and conditions of open-endings by closed-end funds are declared 
via press releases and become public. Usually this occurs 5 to 7 months before the 
open-ending. Alternatively, the fund may announce that according to fund's 
prospectus, a sufficiently large discount exists for a specified time period to require a 
shareholder vote on open-ending. An example is provided in the following statement 
contained in the announcement by the Dessauer Global Equity Fund:  
“…The Fund’s prospectus provides that after 18 months from the date of the fund’s initial 
public offering, the fund will automatically convert to an open-end investment company if 
its shares close at a market price that is at a 5% or greater discount to the net asset value 
of the fund on the last business day of any week and for each of the next 14 business 
days.” (LexisNexis Archives, Open-ending Announcement, January, 6 1999). 
Brauer (1984) is among the first to study open-ending behavior of closed-end fund. 
He studies a sample of 14 closed-end funds that open-end and finds that open-ending 
behaviors correspond in predictable ways to the incentive to open-end and to potential 
12 
 
resistance to open-end. Discount is positively associated with open ending and fees 
negatively with open ending. Fund share prices begin to generate statistically positive 
abnormal return well in advance of the formal announcement of the open ending. 
Positive abnormal returns generated by reorganizing closed end funds allow 
shareholders to obtain the market value of the fund‟s assets and he documents an 
abnormal return of 9.3% during the announcement month and the following month. 
Brauer (1984) records that funds with high discount and low management expense 
ratios are more likely to open-end. He also documents that most of the positive 
abnormal return associated with open-ending is incorporated into the market price by 
the end of the announcement month. This timely market reaction is consistent with a 
market for closed-end funds that is generally efficient. Dimson and Minio-Paluello 
(2002) state that Draper (1989) found very similar results for U.K. closed-end funds. 
Brauer (1988) studies information content of discount and finds that discount partially 
incorporate the likelihood of open ending. In his study, he focuses on the potential for 
open-ending. He states that a trading strategy can be profitable if it identifies 
candidates for open-ending, the likelihood of which depends on the size of the 
discount and the management expense ratio. This finding suggests that closed-end 
funds‟ discounts contain information that can be used in a model to predict open-
ending activity. 
Brickley and Schallheim (1985) assess 16 closed-end funds that reorganize and find 
positive abnormal returns in response to the announcement and report an average 
abnormal return of 15.3% by investing on the last day of the month in which the 
announcement is made and holding until the fund is reorganized. These abnormal 
returns after the announcement of open-ending is not consistent with the joint 
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hypothesis that the market is efficient and that the market model is the correct return 
benchmark for funds undertaking reorganizations. 
Deaves and Krinsky (1994) investigated the evidence that discounts and managerial 
performance are not negatively related. More specifically, they argued that investors 
may attach an increased probability to open-ending for funds with poor managerial 
performance, which by definition moves the price toward the NAV, in which case, 
the discount narrows as managerial performance declines. Akhigbe, Madura and 
Tucker (2005) study the motivation and performance following open ending of 
closed-end funds. They find funds with more pronounced discount, larger size, more 
volatility and higher expense ratios are more likely to open-end. Guercio, Dann and 
Partch (2003) assess the governance in closed-end funds and finds restructuring in 
closed-end funds are related with governance arrangement. Khorana, Wahal and 
Zenner (2002) find that fund with larger premium are more likely to have right 
offerings. Weiss (1989) finds that closed-end funds usually start out at premium of 
about 10% on IPOs and that, on average, these funds move to 10 percent discount 
within four months.  
Lee, Shleifer and Thaler (1991) propose an investor sentiment factor to explain 
closed-end fund discount. The systemic existence of discount or premium in closed-
end funds has attracted a lot of academic interest. Pontiff (1996) suggests that costly 
arbitrage can drive prices of securities to deviate from their fundamental values. He 
concludes that closed-end funds that are difficult to replicate, pay smaller dividends 
and have larger bid-ask spreads are more likely to exhibit pronounced mispricings. 
„These factors explain about a quarter of mispricing variation‟ [Pontiff (1996, p. 
1150)]. Pontiff (1997) finds that return volatility of closed-end fund is higher than its 
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underlying assets. Chordia and Swaminathan (1997) argue that market segmentation 
and asymmetric information lead to closed-end fund discounts. Cherkes, Sagi and 
Stanton (2005) propose a liquidity-based model for closed-end fund discount. They 
argues that closed-end fund provides means for investors to buy illiquid securities, 
without facing the costs associated with direct trading should they later need to 
liquidate their positions. Xia, Wu and Jain (2005) relate discounts or premiums in 
closed-end country funds with market illiquidity measures. They find that illiquidity 
in asset (share) market positively (negatively) affects premium in segmented capital 
markets. Bradley, Brav, Goldstein and Jiang (2005) show that shareholder activism 
aimed at open-ending closed-end funds has become more frequent since SEC‟s 
reform of proxy rules in 1992. Wermers, Wu and Zechner (2005) study the dynamics 
of discount in closed-end fund before manager turnovers. They find that 
discount/price incorporates managerial turnover information and that discount adjusts 
to average level well before turnover.      
Another stream of literature analyzing open-ending closed-end funds examines block 
ownership and governance issues. Barclay, Holderness and Pontiff (1993) report a 
stable and strong cross-sectional relation between the discounts and the concentration 
of stock ownership. As the fraction of stock owned by management increases, the 
discount to net asset value becomes larger. They also argue that blockholders resist to 
open-ending decision mainly because they do not want to lose their private benefits. 
In a more recent study, Del Guercio, Dann and Partch (2003) find evidence that board 
independence and structure are associated with the effectiveness of the board 
representing shareholders interests. Using discounts and expense ratios as a measure 
of board effectiveness, they report that more independent boards are more likely to 
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restructure the fund in the face of large discounts from net asset value. However, 
contrary to the evidence in Barclay, Holderness and Pontiff (1993), they do not find a 
relation between blockholdings and fund discounts and blockholdings and the 
probability of a restructuring event.  
In this study, I restrict my focus to the abnormal return generated by the termination 
announcement and the behavior of discount and since there have been no empirical 
studies on close ending in closed-end fund industry, nor does the literature 
differentiate various choices of open ending, e.g., liquidation vs. conversion to mutual, 
therefore, it is meaningful for this study to examine how closed-end funds will be 
ended, what are the determinants for the choices of the ways that they are ended and 
whether a choice of close ending vs. open ending by a fund is optimal in that a fund 
makes exiting decision relevant to its organizational form, underlying assets, 
performance, management and arbitrage. This paper does not attempt to provide 
economic rationales for pervasiveness of discounts in closed-end funds; rather it takes 
discounts or premiums as given factors when a fund makes termination decisions. 
One hypothesis of this study is that discounts should not be significantly associated 
with the probability for a fund to open-end, unless there are some market frictions to 
make arbitrage in open ending costly. A direct implication is that there is no 
predictive power of discount for open ending probability. Since fund can impose 
transaction fees in cases of conversion to mutual or merger into mutual fund, 
predictive power of discount should be strong. The previous findings that discounts 
predict open ending in the literature are mainly driven by the latter two cases. Similar 
with Wermers, Wu and Zechner (2005), this study finds that there is persistently 
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larger discount for funds to exit and that discount goes to average level when funds 
announce the exiting decision.      
3. Data, Statistics Description and Methodology 
A. Data 
 
I obtain data on all closed-end fund returns, price and volume from CRSP and data on 
fund NAV and other characteristics from CRSP and Compustat merged data set. The 
sample period is from January 1994 through December 2004 as CRSP and Compustat 
merged data set starts to report NAV for closed-end funds at end of year 1993. I also 
obtain additional fund information such as fund exit or reorganization, fund age, asset 
holdings and fund charter provisions from SEC Edgar file. The total sample consists 
of 506 closed-end funds (maximum number) with 104 exiting funds, among which 
there are 32 funds to close-end, 29 funds to liquidate, 24 funds to convert to open-end 
mutual funds and 19 funds to be merged into mutual funds. Among all mergers, only 
five happen across different fund families. For each merger announcement, a target 
fund and acquiring fund are identified, along with a termination date for the target 
fund. The monthly and quarterly data includes fund price, return, fund NAV, dividend, 
shares outstanding and shares traded. I calculate annually compounded fund return, 
NAV compounded return, annually average dividend yield, discount or premium, 
fund market values using monthly data. I also hand collect fund annual expense ratio 
and turnover ratio from SEC website.  
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B. Methodology: 
 
To test if the termination announcements generate abnormal returns and how different 
are the abnormal return magnitudes across different fund groups that exhibiting in 
different ways on the closed end fund share price, I employ a standard event study 
approach. The open-ending announcement date is treated day zero in event time. I 
estimate the market model using price returns. The estimation period is from –250 to 
–21, and the market model is estimated with CRSP equally weighted index. The 
abnormal returns, ARi,t , is defined as the difference between the realized returns and 
the expected returns based on the estimated parameters from the market model:  
ARi,t=Ri,t  - (ai + biRm,t)                                                                                                  (1) 
The average abnormal returns by different portfolios are computed across event dates. 
The cumulative average abnormal daily return over a period is: To 
examine the statistical significance of the abnormal returns, a z – statistic is computed as: 
, where n is the sample size, and   is the average standardized 
abnormal return on day t.4 
 
                                                          
4
 Let σI denote the standard deviation of the residuals in the market model estimation period; 
Ti the number of days in the estimation period; Rmt the return to the equally –weighted market 
portfolio on day t, and the mean return to the market portfolio over the estimation period. 
The standardized abnormal return (SAR) on day t is computed as: 
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The share price discount is conventionally calculated as : 
Discount i,t=(NAV i,t –PRICEi,t )/NAVi,t ,                                                                     (2)                                    
where NAV is the net asset value and a discount is, of course, simply a negative 
number here. So premium will have a positive sign.   
The return of a fund‟s net asset value can be computed from the discount and stock 
return information. Specifically,  
NAV R i,t =(1+RXi,t)(1-Discount i,t-1)/(1-Discount i,t)+(R i,t -RX i,t)(1-Discount i,t)-1                      (3) 
where RX is stock return without dividend, R is stock return.  In months when no 
dividend is paid, the second term is zero.  
The other variables used in the regressions are fund return, dividend yield, fund 
market value, fund age and dummy for asset classes and interactive terms between 
asset class dummy and discount. Fund return is measured as the annually holding 
period return of the fund before the time t, where t represents the termination 
announcement date. Fund size is the monthly average of market value for the fund 
one year before time t. Fund age is the log value of fund existing years since its 
inception year.   
I construct the variables so that they reflect the decision making process by 
management. All the dependent variables are formed using the averages one year 
before time t, at which time fund board approves exiting decisions. So at each time t, 
fund faces choices of whether and how to exit using past year information. 
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Consistent with other literature on fund merger or reorganization studies, we employ 
multi-logit regression to analyze fund exit decisions. Specifically, probability:     
(Fund Exit Dummy )i,t = exp(β'Xi,t )/*1+exp(β'Xi,t)],                                                                        (4)                         
 β'Xi,t = α +  β1i(Ri,t )+β2(NAV Ri,t )+ β3i(Discount i,t)+ β4i(Dividend Yield i,t)+ 
                        β5i(Fund Size i,t)+β6i(Fund Age i,t)+ β7i(Expense ratioei,t)+ β8i(Turnoveri,t)+ 
            β9i(Asset Class i,t)+β10i(Asset Class*Discount i,t)+e i,t                                  (5)     
C. Sample Description 
 
Table I reports the distributions of funds that exit by year. There are totally 104 funds 
that exit for the period from January 1994 through December 2004. Among them, 32 
funds choose to close-end by merging into other closed-end funds. There are 72 open-
ending funds. Among them, 29 funds choose to liquidate, 24 convert themselves to 
mutual funds, and 19 merge into open-end mutual funds. Most of the mergers 
(including merger by closed-end fund and open-end fund) take places within same 
fund family. Among all 51 mergers, there are only 5 mergers that happen across 
different families. In all 29 liquidated funds there are 13 funds to liquidate when they 
reach maturity date according to the charters. 
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Table 1: Summary for closed-end fund merger, open-ending and liquidation 
 
Distribution of the 104 close-end funds sample that announced exiting decisions 
during the period from January 1994 to December 2004. 
 
Year 
Close-ended 
close-end 
funds 
Liquidated 
(Open-
ended) 
Opened to 
mutual 
(Open-
ended) 
Merged into 
open-end 
funds 
(Open-
ended) 
Total Open-
ended close-
end funds 
 
Total 
Funds 
1994 0 0 0 0 0 450 
1995 0 0 0 1 1 469 
1996 4 1 4 1 6 513 
1997 3 2 6 0 8 534 
1998 1 4 2 6 12 502 
1999 5 5 1 2 8 452 
2000 9 4 5 4 13 410 
2001 4 1 3 3 7 433 
2002 3 8 1 2 11 448 
2003 1 2 1 0 3 485 
2004 2 2 1 0 3 347 
Total 32 29 24 19 72  
 
Table II reports the distribution of funds by investment objectives. Panel A reports the 
distribution of all funds by investment objectives from year January 1994 through 
December 2004. Municipal bond funds are the most common ones in this sample and 
represent 33.5 percent. Emerging market stock funds are the second mostly 
represented group, which contribute up to 15 percent of the whole sample. Other 
bond fund objectives such as corporate high yield represent 7 percent of the sample. 
Mortgage backed securities funds represent 3% of the sample. Panel B shows the 
distribution of exiting funds by investment objectives. 21 Municipal bond funds 
choose to close-end while only 6 Municipal funds open-end. There are 23 Emerging 
market funds to open-end while only 4 to close-end.   
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Table 2: Distribution of Funds by main asset classes for the sample period from   
               January 1994 to December 2004. 
 
Panel A: For all close-end funds  
  
Year 
Municipal 
bond 
High-
yield 
bond 
Convertible 
bond 
Emerging 
equity 
International 
equity 
Mortgage Total 
1994 143 26 8 53 17 20 450 
1995 143 31 11 80 16 21 469 
1996 143 31 11 83 15 17 513 
1997 144 33 9 84 15 17 534 
1998 149 34 8 81 11 16 502 
1999 154 33 9 71 12 12 452 
2000 148 31 8 68 9 11 410 
2001 144 31 7 61 9 10 433 
2002 165 33 7 57 8 11 448 
2003 179 32 8 53 7 11 485 
2004 176 31 8 50 6 12 347 
 
Panel B: For all close-end funds that are terminated (open-ended/close ended) 
during the sample period 
Exiting 
Options 
Municipal  
Bond 
Corporate 
High-
yield 
Bond 
Convertible 
Bond 
Emerging 
market 
equity 
International 
equity 
Government 
Mortgage 
End 27 7 2 27 1 10 
Close- 
end 
21 2 1 4 0 1 
Open-
end 
6 5 1 23 1 9 
Liquidate 3 2 0 8 0 3 
Open to 
mutual 
1 0 1 9 0 0 
Merge 
into 
mutual 
2 3 0 6 1 6 
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Table III reports the summary statistics for fund NAV, price, compounded annual 
return, NAV compounded annual return, annual discount level, annual dividend yield, 
fund market value (fund size) and age. The full sample is divided into sub-samples 
according to the funds exiting approaches. I find marked differences among sub-
samples. First, the mean discount of funds that exit is much larger than those in 
existence. The average annual discount for the whole sample is 4.8 percent, compared 
with an average annual discount before termination of 7.04 percent for funds to close-
end and 10.28 percent for funds to open-end. The average market value (fund size) of 
the whole sample is about 210.74 million, much larger than 121.533 million of close-
ended funds and 146.39 million of open-ended funds. The underlying performance of 
funds that exit is economically and statistically worse than that of existence. The 
closed-ended funds have a mean NAV compounded annual return of 0.1 percent and 
the open-ended funds have a mean NAV compounded annual return of 0.3 percent. 
The whole sample funds perform much better with a monthly NAV return of 0.9 
percent.  The statistics in this table show firstly that funds with persistently larger 
discount and smaller size are more likely to exit. Secondly, funds with high dividend 
yield are more likely to be acquired by other closed-end funds and less likely to 
liquidate or convert to mutual. 
Table 3:  Summary statistics for fund characteristics 
 Mean Median Min Max SD 
Panel A. Sample of all close-end funds  
NAV 13.982 13.676 1.696 267.003 10.61 
Price 13.068 12.477 1.849 246.489 9.814 
Return .0013 .0022 -0.129 0.1715 .0162 
NAV return .0089 .0067 -1.9157 1.4729 .1927 
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Discount .0482 -.0629 -.4356 .8166 .0965 
Dividend yield .0197 .0174 0 .1383 .013 
Age 10.04   11  1 19 5.28 
Size (Million) 210.742 126.882 9.536   2613.434 262.99 
Panel B. Sample of close-end funds that are close-ended (merged into other close-end funds) 
NAV 14.34 13.79 7.16 56.43         7.77 
Price 13.19 12.76 6.20 48.86 6.65 
Return .004 .0086 -.131 .0788 .0418 
NAV return .0009 -.0011 -.0335 .0627 .0187 
Discount .0704 -.0624 -.2303 .0553 .059 
Dividend yield .0199 .0163 .0006 .0464 .0112 
Age 6.868 6 1 19 5.94 
Size 121.533 78.6665 15.512 669.913 138.307 
Panel C. Sample of close-end funds that are open-ended 
NAV 14.71 11.87 5.41 162.29 19.05 
Price 13.07 10.48 4.47 147.78 17.32 
Return .0076 .0135 -.077 .0617 .0289 
NAV return .0032 .0006 -.0159 .1015 .017 
Discount .1028 -.1087 -.2260 .4395 .092 
Dividend yield .0127 .0137 0 .056 .0104 
Share traded 53.61 52.67 15.75 154.22 53.61 
Age 8.22 8 2 18 3.77 
Size 146.396 101.677 149.825 515.904 127.841 
Panel D. Sample of close-end funds that are opened to mutual 
NAV 13.33 14.28 7.34 31.80   5.40 
Price 12.64 11.33 6.20 28.63 4.69 
Return .0106 .0206 -.0771 .0618 .038 
NAV return .0114 .0081 -.0159 .1015 .0256 
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Discount .1002 -.1348 -.1913 .4395 .1283 
Dividend yield .0071 .0049 0 0.028 .0083 
Share traded 64.52 58.96 17.96 154.22 32.68 
Age 8 8.30 2 18 3.84 
Size   177.791 176.613   243.385 515.390 136.987 
Panel E. Sample of close-end funds that are liquidated 
NAV 17.29 11.22 5.41 162.29 29.73 
Price 15.32 10.01 4.47 147.78 27.11 
Return   .0059 .0137 -.0544 .0322 .0217 
NAV return -.0001 .0004 -.0153 .0161 .0065 
Discount .1146 -.1223 -.2260 .0201 .0623 
Dividend yield .0139 .0152 0 .0254 .0076 
Share traded 47.90 43.87 15.75 94.98 23.76 
Age 9.15 9 4 18 3.68 
Size 118.687 843.07 149.182 446.858 108.852 
Panel F. Sample of close-end funds that are merged into other open-end mutual funds 
NAV 11.16   11.34 6.51 15.12 2.49 
Price 10.03 9.96 6.78 12.72 1.86 
Return .0059 .0062 -.0644 .0507 .0258 
NAV return -.0032 -.0032 -.0139 .0106 .0067 
Discount .087 -.0924 -.1833 .1228 .068 
Dividend yield .0186 .0175 0 .0562 .0135 
Share traded 47.21 42.45 25.25 85.42 20.66 
Age 6.56 5 3 15 3.44 
Size 148.093 925.117 255.997 471.598 140.615 
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Figure 1 below shows the discounts adjustments of close-end funds before exiting. 
Discount decreases before open ending and is close to zero on the event date, while 
there is still a discount of about 10 percent for close ending funds even though 
discount amount decreases also. Discount for liquidating close-end funds approaches 
to zero on the event date, while for close-end funds that are converged to mutual or 
merged into other mutual funds, discount remains at about 5 percent on the event date.  
Figure 1.  Discount Adjustment by Termination Methods Before Exiting  
 
Panel A. Discount adjustment before open-ending of close-end funds 
 
Panel B. Discount adjustment before close-ending of close-end funds 
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Panel C. Discount adjustment before Liquidation of close-end funds 
 
Panel D. Discount adjustment before conversion to mutual of close-end funds 
 
Panel E. Discount adjustment before merger into mutual of close-end funds 
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4. Hypothesis and Main result 
A. Hypotheses 
      1. A testable hypothesis consistent with incentive to open-end a close-end fund 
consequently is that terminating close-end funds that are open-ended have larger 
discounts than those that are close-ended.  
H1: Discount open-ended > Discount close-ended 
This hypothesis can be easily tested using a Wald test in multi-logit regressions. The 
dummies are 0 if fund continues to live, 1 if a fund is closed-ended and 2 if a fund is 
open-end.  
      2. Sequentially comes with the hypothesis that funds that are open-ended should 
have a larger 3-day around the termination announcement day cumulative abnormal 
return CAR (t-1, t, t+1) than funds that are close-ended. 
           H2: CAR (t-1, t, t+1), open-ended > CAR (t-1, t, t+1), close-ended 
3.  Moreover, discounts are almost eliminated when close-end funds are open-
ended as indicated previously in figure 1, while there still remains a certain amount of 
discounts for funds that are close-ended, therefore, a third testable hypothesis is that 
funds that are close-ended should have a less significant relationship between CAR 
and discount than funds that are open-ended. 
H3: β (CAR, Discount), open-ended > β (CAR, Discount), close-ended   
This hypothesis can be tested by running a multivariate analysis with the CAR as 
dependent variable, discount and dummy variables for close-ended funds vs. open-
ended funds as independent variables, size and liquidity as control variables. To 
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further test this hypothesis we can also run the regression by including more variables 
such as the average past twelve month return, return volatility and bid-ask spread ect. 
4. Consistent with open-ending motivation and arbitrage, another testable 
hypothesis is that discount is not systematically predictive of liquidation probability.  
     H4: β (discount, liquidation) =0 
To test this hypothesis, we set dummy variables equal to 0 if a fund continues to live, 
1 if a fund is close-ended, 2 if a fund is liquidated, 3 if a fund opens to mutual and 4 if 
a fund merges into another mutual fund in the multi-factor regressions.  
       5. Dividend payment plays an important role in close-end funds that can be 
thought as investment vehicles for income. A typical close-end fund adopts a target 
distribution policy that commits to payout a large proportion of net asset. As long as a 
fund generates reasonable dividend yield, it is less likely to be open-ended. A testable 
hypothesis is that dividend should be negatively related with open ending but 
positively with close ending.  
H5: β (dividend, close-ended) > 0 and β (dividend, open-ended) <0 
       6. Likewise, as long as a fund generates reasonable return/NAV return, it is less 
likely to be open-ended. A testable hypothesis is that there should be a negative and 
significant relationship between return/NAV return and the likelihood of open ending.  
H6: β (return/NAV return, open-ended) <0 
7. If discount is caused by stochastic investor sentiments, such shock must be 
industry-wide and affects funds of same sector. Both merged funds and acquiring 
funds should experience similar level of discount. A testable hypothesis is that the 
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coefficients of discount for acquiring funds are not significantly different from that of 
merged funds.  
     H7: β (discount, acquiring) = β (discount, merger) 
This differs from common stock merger and acquisition in which relative valuations 
of target and acquiring firms are important factors. In close-end fund merger and 
acquisition, NAV is known to both fund managers and investors.  
B. Main Results 
As the hypotheses discussed above, we expect that funds of significant discounts are 
more likely to open-end. We also expect that funds with under-performance in NAV 
or lower dividend yields are more likely to open-end. Funds of larger size and older 
age are less likely to exit since fund family tends to keep these funds for fees and 
reputation capital. Municipal bond funds and high yield bond funds are less likely to 
open-end since the cost would be high in providing liquidity.    
Table IV presents the results of the multi-logit regressions, in which the indexing 
dependent variable equals one if a fund is merged into other close-end fund, two if a 
fund converts itself to mutual fund, three if a fund liquidates and four if a fund is 
merged into an open-end fund. In this study, I consider three regression models and 
report the results respectively. Panel A in Table 5 reports the regression without 
control dummies for asset classes. Panel B shows the results of regression with only 
control dummies for asset classes and Panel C shows the results of regression with 
control dummies and interactive terms between asset classes and discounts.  
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Table 5:   
Panel A.  Multi-logit regression  
This table reports a simple multi-logit regression for funds to exit in different mechanisms. 
The dependent variables are dummies: 0 if a fund continues to live, 1 if a fund chooses to 
close-end, 2 if a fund liquidates, 3 if a fund opens itself to mutual and 4 if a fund merges into 
other mutual funds. The independent variables are past yearly compounded return, yearly 
NAV compounded return, past annual average discount level, past yearly compounded 
dividend yield, fund market value, age, past annual expense ratio and turnover rate. The 
sample period is from January 1994 to Dec 2004 and the sample includes all close-end funds 
in CRSP data. Total sample observations are 9413, which include 104 terminated close-end 
funds. The robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.     
  
 
Close-ended 
close-end funds 
Liquidated 
(Open-ended) 
Opened to 
mutual 
(Open-
ended) 
Merged into open-
end funds 
(Open-ended) 
Return 
16.411 
(15.77) 
-18.536 
(8.71) 
-28.763 
(11.58) 
-64.512 
(20.293) 
NAV Return 
-0.506 
(1.507) 
-2.255 
(1.109) 
-1.496 
(0.63) 
-4.86 
(2.19) 
Discount 
3.017 
(1.895) 
-2.457 
(1.051) 
-4.492 
(2.917) 
-3.955 
(1.668) 
Dividend Yield 
5.922 
(1.757) 
-23.746 
(6.477) 
-39.324 
(16.439) 
4.717 
(6.011) 
Fund Size 
-1.001 
(0.452) 
-1.161 
(0.255) 
-0.293 
(0.423) 
-0.267 
(0.309) 
Fund Age 
-0.837 
(0.294) 
-0.41 
(0.311) 
-0.246 
(0.46) 
0.049 
(0.389) 
Expense Ratio 
-7.531 
(32.46) 
-7.904 
(27.853) 
-26.39 
(61.943) 
-153.224 
(74.745) 
Turnover 
0.066 
(0.136) 
-0.627 
(0.564) 
0.393 
(0.102) 
-0.576 
(0.606) 
Constant 
-2.523 
(1.692) 
-2.782 
(1.442) 
-3.602 
(2.829) 
-0.29 
(1.901) 
Pseudo R
2
 0.52 
Total 
Observations 
9413 (104 terminated close-end funds in total) 
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Panel B. Multi-logit regression controlling for fund asset classes 
This table reports a simple multi-logit regression for funds to exit in different mechanisms. 
The dependent variables are dummies: 0 if a fund continues to live, 1 if a fund chooses to 
close-end, 2 if a fund liquidates, 3 if a fund opens itself to mutual and 4 if a fund merges into 
other mutual funds. The independent variables are past yearly compounded return, yearly 
NAV compounded return, past annual average discount level, past annual average dividend 
yield, fund market value, age, past annual expense ratio and turnover rate. Other independent 
variables are dummies for different asset classes. The sample period is from January 1994 to 
Dec 2004 and the sample includes all close-end funds in CRSP data. Total sample 
observations are 9413. The robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.     
 
 
 
Close-ended close-
end funds 
Liquidated 
(Open-ended) 
Opened to mutual 
(Open-ended) 
Merged into open-
end funds 
(Open-ended) 
Return 
2.667 
(1.992) 
-2.987 
(1.468) 
-4.749 
(1.741) 
-7.389 
(2.695) 
NAV Return 
-1.661 
(2.26) 
-3.063 
(1.284) 
-3.845 
(1.860) 
-5.441 
(2.051) 
Discount 
4.254 
(2.387) 
-2.452 
(1.177) 
-3.508 
(1.937) 
-3.258 
(4.703) 
Dividend 
Yield 
6.034 
(2.260) 
-19.069 
(5.592) 
-33.111 
(12.466) 
3.203 
(7.656) 
Fund Size 
-0.64 
(0.243) 
-0.138 
(0.275) 
-0.284 
(0.438) 
-1.717 
(0.392) 
Fund Age 
-0.932 
(0.328) 
-0.901 
(0.308) 
-0.721 
(0.427) 
0.052 
(0.582) 
Expense 
Ratio 
8.339 
(25.551) 
-13.674 
(26.681) 
-25.712 
(53.565) 
-226.195 
(92.639) 
Turnover 
0.067 
(0.148) 
-0.988 
(0.651) 
0.3 
(0.096) 
-0.972 
(0.914) 
Municipal 
dummy 
0.085 
(0.499) 
-2.314 
(0.600) 
-37.514 
(0.588) 
-0.419 
(0.958) 
Emerging 
dummy 
-1.244 
(0.764) 
-1.2 
(0.840) 
-1.266 
(0.962) 
1.916 
(0.877) 
High yield 
dummy 
0.087 
(0.803) 
-37.004 
(0.422) 
-36.219 
(0.647) 
0.436 
(1.052) 
Mortgage 
dummy 
-0.032 
(1.051) 
-37.849 
(0.510) 
-36.641 
(0.860) 
3.24 
(1.003) 
Constant 
-2.746 
(1.652) 
-0.542 
-1.37 
-1.584 
-2.917 
2.141 
-2.882 
Pseudo R
2
 0.61 
Total 
Observations 
9413 (104 terminated close-end funds in total) 
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Panel C. Multi-logit regression controlling for asset classes and discounts 
interactive terms 
 
Close-ended close-
end funds 
Liquidated 
(Open-ended) 
Opened to 
mutual 
(Open-ended) 
Merged into open-end 
funds 
(Open-ended) 
Return 
2.553 
(1.909) 
-2.791 
(1.094) 
-4.691 
(1.708) 
-7.858 
(2.788) 
NAV Return 
-1.46 
(2.21) 
-3.887 
(1.494) 
-3.627 
(1.796) 
-7.999 
(3.058) 
Discount 
0.78 
(2.814) 
-2.804 
(1.706) 
5.432 
(3.485) 
16.032 
(8.337) 
Dividend Yield 
5.684 
(2.949) 
-23.79 
(6.504) 
-31.567 
(13.100) 
5.19 
(7.355) 
Fund Size 
-0.651 
(0.245) 
-0.209 
(0.286) 
-0.274 
(0.44) 
-1.762 
(0.410) 
Fund Age 
-0.392 
(0.339) 
-1.09 
(0.333) 
-0.669 
(0.436) 
0.032 
(0.571) 
Expense Ratio 
4.817 
(28.758) 
-18.035 
(28.559) 
-25.34 
(54.827) 
-200.334 
(103.313) 
Turnover 
0.071 
(0.151) 
-0.945 
(0.631) 
0.307 
(0.096) 
-1.131 
(1.057) 
Municipal 
dummy 
-0.696 
(0.577) 
-2.407 
(0.601) 
-34.859 
(0.695) 
2.371 
(1.835) 
Emerging 
dummy 
-2.35 
(1.407) 
-1.408 
(0.778) 
-0.771 
(0.938) 
5.004 
(1.578) 
High yield 
dummy 
-0.151 
(0.231) 
(0.804) 
-34.813 
(0.431) 
-33.74 
(0.713) 
3.564 
(1.866) 
   Mortgage 
Dummy 
- .042 
(1.121) 
-31.809 
(0.632) 
-32.521 
(0.899) 
2.96 
(1.119) 
Municipal*discou
nt 
-0.117 
(0.857) 
-35.679 
(0.538) 
-34.074 
(0.842) 
2.662 
(1.665) 
Emerging*Disco
unt 
8.136 
(4.890) 
-2.658 
(2.907) 
-6.868 
(3.786) 
-22.262 
(16.154) 
High 
yield*discount 
2.997 
(6.108) 
4.736 
(3.084) 
-3.31 
(3.946) 
-9.113 
(7.024) 
Mortgage*discou
nt 
-0.197 
(5.942) 
2.192 
(2.947) 
-5.606 
(3.858) 
-13.833 
(11.450) 
Constant 
-0.852 
(-6.06) 
4.53 
(-4.497) 
-4.702 
(-6.212) 
-6.496 
(9.726) 
Pseudo R
2
 0.67 
Total 
Observations 
9413 (104 terminated close-end funds in total) 
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Consistent with our prior, we find a negative and statistically significant relationship 
between discount and the likelihood of a liquidation or merger into mutual fund. 
However, discount is not significantly associated with the likelihood of a merger into 
other closed-end fund or conversion to mutual fund. We also find a negative and 
significant relationship between NAV return and the likelihood of open ending. Size 
of fund is negatively associated with the likelihood of liquidation. The larger the fund 
size is, the more loss with liquidation for fund management company. We also find 
negative and significant coefficients for both size and age in close-ending funds. Fund 
performance or return is negatively associated with the likelihood to open-end. 
Dividend yield is only significantly negatively associated with the likelihood to 
convert to open-end fund and to liquidate while it is not significant in the likelihood 
to merge into mutual fund.  
Consistent with asset classes, we find in Panel B of Table IV that municipal dummy 
and mortgage dummy are negative and significant in predicting the likelihood to open 
to mutual fund or liquidate. Municipal dummy is positive but not significant in 
predicting the likelihood to close-end. More importantly, when the asset classes are 
controlled, the discount is not significantly related with the likelihood to merge into 
mutual fund. Emerging market fund and mortgage-backed securities fund are more 
likely to merge into open-end mutual funds.  
In Panel C, the discount is only marginally significant at case of merger into open-end 
fund; consistent with our hypothesis that discount should not systematically relate 
with open ending. The interactive term between municipal bond dummy and discount 
is negative and significant in predicting the likelihood to liquidate or open to mutual. 
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The intuition is that conditional on a fund investing in municipal bond, the more 
discount, the less likely for it to liquidate.   
By calculating the 3-day around the termination announcement day cumulative 
abnormal return CAR (t-1, t, t+1) across funds exiting in different ways and running a 
regression test on the open-end/close-end announcement dummy variable, table 6 
documents significant abnormal returns to the funds 3-day around the termination 
announcement day. The mean 3-day cumulative abnormal return CAR (t-1, t, t+1)  for the 
whole sample is 9.12 percent and the CARs (t-1, t, t+1)  for funds exiting in different 
ways are different. Funds which choose to open-end have a higher mean CAR (t-1, t, t+1) 
than funds that choose to close-end and the difference is significant.  Close-ended 
funds have an mean CAR (t-1, t, t+1) of 5.08 percent, while open-ended funds have a 
mean CAR (t-1, t, t+1) of 14.67 percent. 
Table 6:  Mean CAR (t-1, t, t+1) across funds exiting in different ways 
 
This table reports the 3-day cumulative abnormal returns for funds to exit in different 
mechanisms. The sample period is from January 1994 to Dec 2004 and the sample includes 
all closed-end funds in CRSP data. There are 104 funds terminated during the sample period.  
 
 
 
Close-
ended 
close-end 
funds 
All open-
ended 
close-end 
funds 
Liquidated 
(Open-
ended) 
Opened to 
mutual 
(Open-
ended) 
Merged 
into open-
end funds 
(Open-
ended) 
Pooled 
(all 
terminated 
close-end 
funds) 
Mean 
CAR(t-1,t,t+1) 
0.0508 0.1467 0.1308 0.1876 0.1136 0.0912 
Total 
Observations 104 terminated close-end funds in total 
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By running an OLS analysis with the CAR as dependent variable, discount and 
dummy variables for close-ended vs. open-ended as independent variables, size and 
liquidity indicators as control variables, Table 7 shows that funds that are close-ended 
have a less significant relationship between CAR and discount while funds that are 
open-ended exhibit a more significant relationship between CAR and discount.  To 
further investigate and run the regression again by including more variables such as 
the average past twelve month return, return volatility and bid-ask spread, again Panel 
B in Table 7 further shows that funds that are close-ended have a less significant 
relationship between CAR and discount than funds that are open-ended. 
Table 7:   
Panel A: OLS regression with CAR as dependent variable 
This table reports a simple OLS regression for funds to exit in different mechanisms. The 
dependent variable is CAR and independent variables are dummies: 0 if a close-end fund is 
open-ended and 1 if a close-end fund chooses to be close-ended. The control variables are the 
liquidity indicator (Voldivsize) and the fund size indicator. The sample period is from 
January 1994 to Dec 2004 and the sample includes all close-end funds in CRSP data. There 
are 104 funds terminated during the sample period. The robust z-statistics are reported in 
parentheses.     
 
 
 
Intercept 
Voldivsize 
(volume/size) 
Logsize 
Log(size) 
Discount 
Close-ended 
close-end funds 
(R
2
=0.11) 
-0.77 
 
-1.68 
(10.34) 
0.17 
(114.07) 
2.70 
(8.62) 
Open-ended 
close-end funds 
(R
2
=0.26) 
1.20 
 
-2.01 
(13.76) 
-0.26 
(7.63) 
4.53 
(91.02) 
Total 
Observations 
104 terminated close-end funds in total 
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Panel B: OLS regression with more control variables 
This table reports a simple OLS regression for funds to exit in different mechanisms. The 
dependent variable is CAR and independent variables are dummies: 0 if a fund is open-ended 
and 1 if a fund chooses to close-end. The control variables are the liquidity indicator 
(Voldivsize), the fund size indicator, mean return, mean spread, as well as return volatility 
indicator. The sample period is from January 1994 to Dec 2004 and the sample includes all 
close-end funds in CRSP data. There are 104 funds terminated during the sample period. 
The robust z-statistics are reported in parentheses.     
 
 Close-ended close-end funds 
 
Open-ended close-end funds 
 
Intercept 
-1.20 
(10.34) 
0.18 
(7.63) 
Voldivsize 
(volume/size) 
-0.37 
(10.34) 
-0.39 
(7.63) 
Logsize 
Log(size) 
0.21 
(114.04) 
-0.09 
(91.02) 
Discount 0.66 
(8.62) 
2.30 
(13.76) 
Meanret 
(mean return) 
8.95 
(0.47) 
4.28 
(4.72) 
Volret 
(return volatility) 
1.59 
(12.82) 
8.13 
(12.12) 
Meanspr 
(mean spread) 
0.29 
(16.62) 
-0.02 
(5.81) 
R
2
 0.27 0.40 
Total Observations 104 terminated close-end funds in total 
 
I also run a multi-logit regression to test hypothesis H7. The dependent variables are 
dummies: 0 if a fund continues to live, 1 if a close-end fund acquires another close-
end fund and 2 if a close-end fund is acquired by another close-end fund. Panel A in 
table 8 reports the results when asset class dummies are not included. Consistent with 
the hypothesis, the coefficients on discount variables for acquiring and merger funds 
are not significantly different. The Wald test has a p-value of 0.6. Panel B in table 8 
reports the results when both asset class dummies and interactive terms between asset 
37 
 
class dummies and discount are included. Again, the results are similar; the individual 
Wald test does not reject the null hypothesis that coefficients are different.  
Table 8: Test of Shleifer and Vishny (1999) 
This table shows the results of multi-logit regressions to test Shleifer and Vishny (1999). The 
dependent variables are dummies: 0 if a fund continues to live, 1 if a fund acquires another 
fund, and 2 if a fund merges into others. The sample includes all funds from CRSP data for 
the period from Jan 1994 through Dec 2004. The robust standard errors are reported in the 
parentheses. The last column of the table reports the p-value for the Wald test to examine 
whether the two coefficients are different. 
Panel A  
 Acquirer Merger 
Test difference 
Return 
-12.941 
(24.019) 
19.613 
(15.186) 
 
 
 
 
βDiscount, 
Acq=βDiscount,Merger 
Prob>Chi2=0.624 
NAV Return 
0.985 
(1.812) 
-1.36 
(1.562) 
Discount 
2.471 
(2.161) 
3.872 
(1.937) 
Dividend Yield 
2.922 
(2.193) 
5.587 
(1.784) 
Fund Size 
0.126 
(0.321) 
-0.566 
(0.253) 
Fund Age 
-0.467 
(0.444) 
-0.107 
(0.305) 
Expense Ratio 
-10.549 
(75.232) 
-11.617 
(33.738) 
Turnover 
0.263 
(0.121) 
0.027 
(0.142) 
Constant 
-5.676 
(2.606) 
-3.491 
(1.785) 
Total Observations 
(Pseudo R
2
 = 0.48) 
51 terminated close-end funds merged by 
other close-end/open-end funds in total  
(51 pairs M&A) 
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Panel B. Multi-factor regression controlling for asset classes 
 Acquisition Merger 
Test difference 
Return 
-0.278 
(2.388) 
2.969 
(1.865) 
 
 
 
 
βDiscount, Acq=βDiscount,Merger 
Prob>Chi2=0.799 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
βDiscount, Acq=βDiscount,Merger 
Prob>Chi2=0.826 
βDiscount, Acq=βDiscount,Merger 
Prob>Chi2=0.784 
βDiscount, Acq=βDiscount,Merger 
Prob>Chi2=0.862 
βDiscount, Acq=βDiscount,Merger 
Prob>Chi2=0.873 
NAV Return 
0.187 
(2.392) 
-2.653 
(2.242) 
Discount 
0.144 
(4.229) 
1.153 
(2.905) 
Dividend Yield 
4.956 
(4.046) 
5.126 
(2.815) 
Fund Size 
0.133 
(0.279) 
-0.534 
(0.245) 
Fund Age 
-0.224 
(0.515) 
-0.21 
(0.337) 
Expense Ratio 
20.809 
(52.827) 
-0.145 
(29.46) 
Turnover 
0.33 
(0.123) 
0.027 
(0.162) 
Municipal dummy 
0.199 
(0.627) 
-0.725 
(0.584) 
Emerging dummy 
-5.713 
(1.226) 
-4.462 
(1.132) 
High yield dummy 
-35.768 
(0.514) 
0.208 
(0.7) 
Mortgage dummy 
-35.804 
(0.634) 
-0.021 
(0.885) 
Municipal*discount 
10.724 
(6.042) 
8.99 
(5.082) 
Emerging*Discount 
22.607 
(5.441) 
20.733 
(5.229) 
High yield*discount 
2.808 
(5.141) 
1.517 
(5.826) 
Mortgage*discount 
-0.695 
(5.886) 
-1.67 
(5.831) 
Constant 
-6.932 
(2.136) 
-3.191 
(1.716) 
Total Observations 
(Pseudo R
2
 = 0.56) 
51 terminated close-end funds merged  
by other close-end/open-end funds in total  
(51 pairs M&A) 
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5. Conclusion 
Using a large sample of closed-end funds from CRSP, the paper provides an analysis 
of the determinants of exiting decisions in closed-end funds. Consistent with previous 
literature, funds with larger discount and smaller size are more likely to exit. Larger 
discount is more strongly associated with the probability for a fund to both open-end 
and close-end. Funds with higher dividend yields are more likely to be merged by 
other closed-end fund since keeping such underlying assets closed-end is optimal. On 
the contrary, dividend yield is negatively related to open ending.  
Existing evidence on open-ending of close-end funds relies on two early studies with 
very small sample sizes of 14 firms. Using a much larger sample of 104 funds that 
exit for the period from January 1994 through December 2004, among which, 32 
funds chose to close-end by merging into other closed-end funds and 72 open ended, 
this study documents a significant cumulative abnormal return of 5.08 percent for 
funds that close ended and an average of above 12 percent for funds that open ended 
during the announcement period.  
If event such as open ending is analytically predictive, rational market should 
incorporate this information into price or discount of closed-end fund. Consistent with 
this hypothesis, we find that discount of funds to open end converges to average level 
well before announcement of such open ending decisions.     
Open ending decision has to take into account rational expectation and arbitrage in 
market. Liquidating funds will fully provide liquidity to redemption, while in case of 
conversion to mutual and merger by mutual, funds are able to impose restrictions to 
make short-term transactions costly. The resulting equilibrium is that discount is 
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unrelated with liquidation but is still associated with other two open-ending methods. 
The evidence supports these predictions. 25 funds among 45 liquidating funds take 
place according to corporate charter.     
If industry-wide investor sentiments affect all the closed-end funds in the same 
industry, both acquiring and merger funds within the same industry will experience 
similar level of discounts. Therefore the merger and acquisition in closed-end funds 
are less likely to be market-driven. Rather it is likely to be in the discretion of fund 
management firms. Factors such as scale of economy are likely to be the rationale for 
merger and acquisition in closed-end funds. 55 funds among 61 mergers take place 
within same fund management companies, suggesting fund management companies 
play important role in closed-end fund governance.   
To continue with this study, further research should address the value of the actual 
distribution to the closed-end fund investors to verify whether this final discount 
represents errors in the reported NAVs or whether there are other costs such as 
redemption fees tacked on to the closed-end fund shares that may provide an 
explanation of the discount. Further studies can also explore the investor gain 
/redemption fee differences for closed-end funds that choose different exiting 
methods and examine the role of fund governance on the pricing behavior during the 
termination process.  
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